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DELTA CHI FRATERNITY.
The Delta Chi fraternity began the year
with.fourteen members. There have since
been three members initiated,-lessrs.
Katz, Holcomb, and Yeager. There were
several informal "feeds," at which the
fraternity has been fortunate in having
present Messrs. Shapley, Shalter, Livingood, and Stevens, alumni members of the
local chapter, and Prof. Woodward, of the
Cornell chapter. The prospects of this
chapter were never brighter.

GLEE CLUB.
The Law School will be very well represented on the Glee Club, the following
members having secured places : Holcomb, (President), and Osborne, first
tenors ; Kostenbauder, second tenor;
O'Keefe and Mitehell, first bass; and
Robitaille, flute in the orchestra. Holcomb and O'Keefe will also be members of
the college quartette.
The Glee Club and orchestra will start
on their trip January 2, 1900, giving entertainments at the following places: Wilmington, Del.; Milford, Del.; Smyrna,
Del.; Easton, Md.; Oxford, M'd.; Cambridge, Md.; Baltimore, Md., and Washington, D. C. They expect to return to
Carlisle by January 9, 1900.

On Monday, Nov. 20th, Dr. J. B. Young
of St. Louis, a college classmate of Dr.
Trickett, appeared unheralded in the recitation room, while the Middlers were assembling, and remained to give a short
talk to the students.
ALUMNII NOTES.
E. Harper Hoffman, of last year's class,
was recently admitted to the"Cumberland
County Bar.
B. Johnston MacEwen, '93, has been
admitted to practice in McKean county.
We clip the following from the Carlisle
Sentinel: "We received by mail this
morning a copy of the Palmyra Record,
volume one, number one, and observe that
its editor is Gabriel H1. Moyer, a graduate
of the Dickinson School of Law, class '98.
The paper is a weekly and number one is
bright, clean and newsy. The accomplished and talented editor, who is well
known here, will undoubtedly succeed in
the field of newspaperdom."
It is rumored that W. Harrison Walker,
'96, of the law firm of Fortney and Walker, of Bellefonte, will probably permit
his name to be used as a candidate for.the
State Senate from Centre county.
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Mr. G. Frank Wetzel. '98, was married
to Miss Estelle Lytle McCoy, of Syracuse,
on November 9th.
Mr. J. Alfred Feight, '97, was married to
Miss Edith James, of Steelton, on November 1st.
Mr. R. U. Capwell, '98, of Scranton, was
married to Miss Frances Coleman, of
Factoryville, on October 19th.
News comes to us of the death of Isaac
L. Moyer, father of Charles G. Moyer, '99,
on October 26th.
Of interest as showing the value put
upon the FoRUx by a graduate of some
years standing is the following extract
from a letter of J. Wilmer Fisher, '96, of
Reading, Pa.:
"I consider the Fonu)R a very important
factor in the Law School. It has the dual
characters of a reference book and history
of the Law School."
The Philadelphia Ledger says that
Harvey S. Kiser, '97, will be the chairman
of the Democratic Standing Committee of
Bucks County.
Charles R. Weeks, '99, is in the law
office of Philbin & Beekman, 111 Broadway, New York City. He writes as follows: "The work in the office is of a
general character, and I find the training
received at the Dickinson Law School of
great benefit to me in performing my
share of it."
DICKINSON SOCIETY.
The Dickinson Literary Society has had
most interesting and profitable meetings
during the last month. It has been especially fortunate in securing both Dr.
Reed and Mr. A. G. Miller to deliver lectures to the society.
On October 14th Dr. Reed, President of
both the College and the Law School, lectured before them on "Some Phases of
Public Speaking." During the lecture he
showed conclusively that public speaking
is still a most prominent factor in the
world's progress; that the man who would

succeed in any profession must needs apply himself most diligently to the development of this faculty in every phase,
and that of all professional men the lawyer is the one who should be proficient in
this art of arts. He made a general appeal
to those present not to let their faculties be
in this line dormant, but to develop them
to their fullest extent. He closed with a
rendition of Hamlet's soliloquy-a selection doubly pleasing coming as iA does
from the pen of so famed a writer and the
tongue of so noted an orator.
None the less highly was the Society entertained and instructed by the able lecture of Mr. A. G. Miller, a prominent
member of the local bar. The students
were greatly pleased to hear from one of
their former instructors. The night was
stormy, but Mr. Miller was, nevertheless,
greeted with a large audience. The subject which the speaker selected was that of
"Trustees and their duties." Mr. Miller
pointed out the great care, skill, and circumspection necessary in the management
of trusts; the great evils and suffering
which invariably result from their mismanagement, and the ever vigilant care
and precaution necessary to an attorney
who would advise a trustee of such an
estate. He closed with a general appeal
for more honesty and integrity in those
who practice the legal profession.
An interesting program which this Society rendered was that of a jury trial
given during the evening of November
17th. The trial was that of a civil case of
assault and battery in which Mr. Ryan appeared as plaintiff, and Mr. Riley as defendant. The plaintiff's attorneys were
Messrs. Clark and John; those of the defendant, Messrs. Bowers and Aubrey. The
case was handled with such ability as to
reflect great credit upon the attorneys who
participated. The trial was dignified by
the presence of Prof. Woodward, who
presided as judge.
At the meeting on November 10th, the
following officers were installed:
President-Winlack.
Vice-President-Gery.
Secretary-O'Keefe.
Treasurer-Riley.
Sergeant-at-Arms-Davis.
District Attorney-Trude.
Constable-Buck.
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Prothonotary-Lavens.
Register of Wills--Hartman.
Warden-Fenton.
Sheriff-Bowers.
Clerk of Court-Rhodes.

THE ALLISON SOCIETY.
During the present month the following
propositions have been debated:
Nov. 2.
Resolved, That England is
justified in her course of action against the
Boers.
Nov. 10. Resolved, That the present
jury system should be abolished.
Nov. 7. Resolved, That the present
system of caucus nomination ought to be
abolished.
Nov. 24. Resolved, That Congress should
should pass a resolution pledging to the
Filipinos the amplest liberty of self-government compatible with the rights and
obligations of the United States, pledging
also the expenditure of all taxes raised in
the Philippines for the benefit of the
Philippines and their inhabitants.
Aside from these debates the members
have had practice in extemporaneous
speaking. Many are taking regularly an
active part in the work, believing that
the profession of the law, perhaps more
than any other, requires clearness, aptness
and force of expression in arguments to the
judge and in addresses to the jury. The
successful lawyer must be prepared not
only to talk while on his feet but to think
while he is talking.
A literary society is an important adjunct of a law school and furnishes an opportunity for preparation not usually afforded to those who study law in an office.
Only by practice can the art of public
speaking be acquired. If one cannot speak
with some degree of force and fluency in
his literary society how can he expect to
command such power when suddenly
called upon at the bar? Where can the
prospective lawyer better acquire skill and
ease in argumentative oral discourse than
in a well conducted literary society where
the interests of clients and his own reputation and success as an advocateare not so
immediately jeopardized ?

THE NEORCAN CLUB.
Some of the members of the Law School,
realizing the value of a knowledge of
EngliSh classics and wishing to develop
those faculties which will aid them in the
practice of law, have begun a new organization which is to be known as the Neorcan
Club. The prime object of this club is to
make its members more familiar with
some of the best English classics. Incidentally the members receive training in
parliamentary law and in the art of extempore speaking. Thus far the club has
done nothing but effect an organization,
and elect the following officers:
President-F.L. Hess.
Vice-President-H.M. Collins.
Secretary-A. G. Bolte.
Critic-L. M. Sebring.
BOOK REVIEWS.
A

Treatise on Criminal Pleading and
Practice. By Joseph -. Beale, Jr.,
Professor of Law in Yarvard University. Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1899.

The "Student's Series" of text books,
to which this is the most recent addition,
is published with special reference to the
needs of law students. Twenty-three volumes have now been issued, every one
prepared by a distinguished law teacher or
writer and almost without exception works
of decided merit. It is the aim of the
publishers that the principles of law shall
be presented as clearly and concisely as
possible, and that the cases cited shall be
selected with the greatest care. In brief,
the books are not digests but treatises.
The volume before us easily measures up
to the high standard of the series. The
author, Mr. Beale, enjoys a high reputation as professor of criminal law at Harvard University, and an examination of
his book proves that he thoroughly understands the difficulties of the subject.
Within its four hundred pages are treated
nearly all of the topics covered by the
larger books. The arrangement is excellent, Part I being devoted to matters before trial, such as jurisdiction, arrest, and
pleading; Part II to the form of th6 in-
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dictment; Part III to the trial, and Part
IV to matters after trial, such as arrest of
judgment, appeal, sentence and pardon.
Part II is particularly satisfactory. Some
of the most difficult forms of indictment
being treated at length and with admirable skill.
The citati6n of authorities appears to be
more copious than in others of the series,
a fact which should make the book of
greater value to the practitioner.
The Law of pleading under the Code of
Civil Procedure. By Edwin B. Bryant,
Dean of the Law Faculty in the University of Wisconsin. Little, Brown.& Co.,
Boston, 1899.
This little volume was first presented to
the public in 1894, and is now in its second
edition. It is oneof the "Student's Series"
and is in the same neat, handy and attractive form which has done much to make
the series popular. The purpose of the
book is to provide an introduction to,
rather than a substitute for, the more elaborate and exhaustive treatises on the subject. Its most striking feature, to employ
the language of the author, is "the combination of a condensed summary of the
common law rules of pleading, an outline
of the equity system of pleading, a general
statement of the code system as now established by statute and interpretation, and
an analytical index of the code provisions
relating to pleadings in the twenty-seven
code states and territories." The consideration of the code system, which, of course,
constitutes the principal part of the work,
is of little value to the Pennsylvania
student or practitioner, but the first one
hundred pages, which are devoted to a
summary or outline of the common law,
equity, and code systems, will be found
both interesting and instructive.
The Junior Class have elected the following officers:
President-feGuffie.
Vice-President-Elmes.
Secretary-Boyer.
Treasurer-Davis.
The Junior Class was photographed
Wednesday, Nov. 22, by Choate & Co.
The Junior Class had an examination in

Real property on Nov. 14. An examination will be held in Contracts on Thursday, the 23rd.
The Glee Club had its picture taken
Wednesday, Nov. 22, by Choate & Co.
News comes to us of the serious and protracted illness of Walter L. Hauck, a member of the Middle Class. Mr. Hauck has
been suffering from appendicitis. He has
undergone three operations since Aug. 2.
Our latest information is that he is slowly
recuperating. The FoRnur desires to express to him the deep concern and sympathy of The School.
PRIZES.
The Dean's prizes are offered as heretofore, for best briefs of liddlers, during the
long term, and for best examination in
Real Property by Juniors.
One of the W. D. Boyer Prizes is offered
to the Middler that produces the best
thesis on Resulting Trusts in Pennsylvania.
ATHLETICS.
Judging from the importance which the
game of basket-ball has attained among
the different athletic associations in the
cities and from the space and attention
given it by the newspapers, the day is not
far distant when this game will bid strongly for the attention of the whole college
world, as football and baseball do now.
And there are good reasons why it-should.
In the first place the season in which it
flourishes is winter, the time when its rivals
are dormant and there is as yet nogame to
feed the public love for excitement and
amusement. In the second place the game
affords the spectacle of strength matched
against strength, of the blocking and
struggle of football, while it gives ample
opportunity for the exhibition under particularly theatrical conditions of individual
speed, agility, and headwork.
Aside from general reasons for interest
in the game, there are very good special
reasons on account of which Dickinson
should this year be particularly interested
in her own team. In the first place, it
will be strong. Captain Taylor, Hess, and
Rothermel, three members of last year's
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team, will be playing. There is an abundance of material, and with these men setting the pace the standard of play must be
high for every position. Among the new
candidates from the Law School are McGuffie and Adamson. McGuffie has a very
good record in this game at Bloomsburg.
A second reason why there should be great
interest in the work of the team is the importance of the games that will be played.
Games have already been scheduled with
Harrisburg and Williamsport Y. M. C. A.
teams, with Bucknell, State and Cornell.
There is also a trip to Philadelphia in prospect for the holidays, and another with
Gettysburg for Dec. 2.
Law men in particular should take great
interest in the team because of the large
proportion of the team that will probably
be composed of men from our department.
There is one subject about which there
has always seemed to be a vast amount of
lack of information, and, worse yet, misinformation of a kind tending to stir up
ill feeling, in circulation among the law
students. This is the subject of contributions to athletics. The FoRum is indebted
to Mr. W. H. Taylor for the following facts
on this subject: The College students pay
annually $8 into the College treasury, and
$2 to the Athletic Association. The College treasury has the full management and
control of both the gymnasium and the
athletic field, and none of this money goes
to the Athletic Association for distribution by its officers. The contribution is
divided into $5 for the gymnasium, and $3
for the maintenance and leasing of the
athletic field. The $2 to the Athletic Association are collected by the association,
and are the only funds over which its
officers have direct control. This makes
$10 per year that students in the College
have to pay for full athletic privileges.
Law students, on the other hand, are at
present paying $3 each per year. This
money is paid directly into the College
treasury, and goes toward paying the lease
and maintaining the athletic field. They
pay nothing toward the gymnasium. They
are, however, entitled to gymnasium
privileges under the same conditions as
College students-i. e. a payment of $5 per
year.

Messrs. W. H. Taylor, Rotherinel, McGuffie and Meyer have been appointed by
the Dickinson Athletic Association to devise means for getting a contribution to the
association from the Law School. The contributions of late years have been voluntary
and usually very small, and this has been
often used as an argument to show our
lack of interest in and support of Dickinson
teams. This year there has been no subscription at all, It is now proposed to
clear the Law School entirely of this charge
of indifference by paying toward the athletic association funds the sum that college
men pay, $2.00 per year. The committee
will sound the sentiment of the three
classes on this matter by circulating a petition to the Dean that $1.00 per term be
added to all bills, and that the resulting
increase be paid to the Athletic Association.
The team is again playing football.
Aftera series of rather disappointing games
the game with Syracuse, though a defeat
for Dickinson, must be a source of encouragement to all who are interested in the
team. In team work, in getting through,
and in speed, the team seems vastly improved. Dickinson's play in the second
half, until near its close, wasan exhibition
of fine football. With so much improvement already attained, and with five
days more under the combined coaching
of Messrs. Stauffer, Carnet and Brooke it
is neither impossible nor improbable that
Dickinson should win from Lafayette.

INCREASE OF LIBRARY.
The Rhode Island Reports have been
put in the School library since the opening
of this term; also, by the kindness of Hon.
Robert L. Myers, representative from this
district, a copy of Smull's Hand Book for
1899. Two additional sets of Pepper and
Lewis' Digest of Statutes have also been
added.
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MOOT COURT.
PATTERSON vs. RIDDLE.
Fraud-Judgment note without consideration,not to be entered until debts accrue: evidence of.
FRANTZ and SLOAN for plaintiff.

1. If maker of note can show absence
of consideration the promise fails, as between maker and first holder.- Fowler v.
Shearer, 7 Mass. 14 ; Winter v. Livingston,
13 Johns. 54; Williams v. Forbes, 14 Il.
167.
2. A party receiving money in confidence is liable as trustee under an implied
trust. Duff v. Wilson, 72 Pa. 442; Rankin
v. Porter, 7 Watts 387.
O'KEEFE and WALLACE for defendant.

1. A person cannot set up a case in
which he must necessarily disclose al illegal purpose as the ground-work of his
claim. Myers v. Meinrath, 101 Mass. 366;
King v. Green, 88 Mass. 139; Worchester
v. Eaton. II Mass. 377.
2. If a judgment be confessed for the
purpose of defrauding creditors the court
will not relieve the defendant from its consequences when sought to be enforced
by its execution. 1 Brightly's Digest,
Illegal Contracts; Brenden's Appeal, 95
Pa. 246; Rankin v. Henry 95 Pa. 393;
Bonesteel v. Sullivan, 104 Pa. 14; Kunkel's
appeal, 107 Pa. 370; Murphy v. Hubert, 16
Pa. 57; Blystone v. Blystone, 51 Pa.
373; Evans v. Doaner, 12 Harris 62;
Shirs v. Endres, 3W. & S. 255; Hendrickson v. Evans, 1 Casey 441.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Patterson, -when not indebted and not
contemplating any definite business in
which debts would be created, gave ajudgment note to Riddle for $5,000, Riddle (his
brother-in-law) agreeing to hold it in trust
for him, and to enter it, should he at any
future time contract debts, but not before.
He violated this agreement, entering the
judgment six weeks afterwards. Not till
two years thereafter did Patterson contract any debt. He then borrowed $2,500
from one Thompson for the purpose of going into business. In this he failed, and
all his property, except his house, was
sold, leaving $2,000 of the Thompson debt
unpaid. Thompson then issued execution
for the remainder of the debt. The house
was sold for $7,100 to Thompson; of this
sum $5,000 was paid Riddle, and $2,100 to
Thompson (debt and interest). Patterson
sues to recover $5,00') from Riddle, All
Patterson's debts have been paid,

OPINION OF THE COURT.
Although the plaintiff was not in debt
and did not anticipate creating debts at
the time of creating the trust, the fact that
he did not want the judgment note of
$5,000, the subject of the trust, entered until
he had created debts, convinces the court
that the trust was created for no other
purpose than that subsequent creditors
should be defrauded.
That the defendant, the trustee, entered
the judgment within two weeks instead
of waiting until the plaintiff had created
debts has no material effect upon the controversy. That the plaintiff's debts were
all paid would reduce the case to the rights
and liabilities of the trustee and the
"cestui que trust."
The principle which runs through the
following cases seems to apply here.
"Where a trust is created, for an unlawful
and fraudulent purpose, the court will
neither enforce the trust, in favor of the
parties, nor'will it assist the settler to recover the estate." Lewis on trusts, chapter
7, section 25; Wucktesten v. Brown, 6
Ves. 68; Chopin v. Chopin, 3 P. W. 233;
Davis v. Ottey, (No. 2) 35 Beav. 208.
Therefore judgment for the defendant.
WALT. TAYLOR, J.
Samuel Patterson gave to Charles Riddle
a note for $5,000, Riddle agreeing to hold
the same in trust until debts had been
made by Patterson. This proceeding, it
has been contended, was for the purpose
of defrauding creditors. It seems, from
the statement of facts, that, at the time
of giving the judgment, Patterson was not
indebted to any one, nor did he contemplate the accruing of any debts; and as a
matter of fact no debts did accrue until
two years after the giving of the judgment into Riddle's hands. The fact that
so long a time elapsed between the two
events, we think, precludes the suspicion
of intention to defraud. We are, therefore,
persuaded that the element of intention to
defraud did not exist in this transaction.
As a matter of fact, no creditors were defrauded, but all were satisfied by execution
and sale of the debtor's property.
What, then, is the status of these two
men'as regards eachother? Riddle, being
the brother-in-law of Patterson, it is natural to suppose that Patterson had confi-
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dence in him, and placed this money in his
hands for safe keeping. Riddle then became merely a bailee and had nojus in re
and retained only the possession of the
property. If it were otherwise by what
right does Riddle hold the $6,000? We
can see nothing by which he would be entitled to refuse the property to Patterson
on demand, either in law or equity. There
was no consideration for this agreement.
He, Riddle, simply held it in trust for Patterson. What was the nature of this trust.
Tiedeman on Real Property, p. 470, defines
express trusts as those created by the "express act of the party owning the property."
We are strongly inclined to
believe that this case falls within Tiedeman's definition of a constructive trust,
p. 481. "It matters not whether the
original holding of such property was legal
or illegal ; if afterwards it becomes illegal
the rule will apply in both cases alike," to
wit: "That the beneficiary can follow
such property into whosesoever hands it
may come with notice of the trust." An
adult certainly can appoint a trustee when
solven. This we believe was the intention
in this case, and that Riddle should hold
the property until demanded by Patterson.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that
Riddle held the said money in a fiduciary
capacity, and that the plaintiff, Samuel
Patterson, should be allowed to recover it
back.
HARE, J.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

A judgment having gone for the defendant, because the judges of the trial court
were divided in opinion, it is necessary
for us to ascertain which of the views taken
by them is the correct one.
Patterson, when not indebted, might
have done almost whatever he chose with
his property. He could have settled it on
his wife, or conveyed it, without consideration, to a stranger. He could not being sui
juris have granted it to a trustee, in trust
for his own benefit, to the exclusion of the
power of such as should become his creditors to appropriate it; Ehrisman v. Sener,
162 Pa. 577; Ghormley v. Smith, 139 Pa.
584; Hahn v. Hutchinson, 159 Pa. 133;
Mackason's Appeal, 42 Pa. 330. If he had
given to Riddle $5,000 of his property, when
he made the judgment note, in order that

Riddle should hold it for him, it would
have been liable for debts contracted afterwards. Possibly the trust would have
been good, if active, as against Patterson,
and not revocable, and Riddle would have
been compelled to perform the trust. The
absence of any fraud upon creditors would
have preserved it.
But, no portion of Patterson's property
was intended to be given to Riddle, when
the note was given to him. The note was
to be retained, and only if future debts
should be contracted, was it to be made
the instrument of securing a portion of
Patterson's property. It. is evident that
the note was simply a device for hindering,
delaying and defrauding creditors. Itwas
not to act at all till there were creditors.
Then it was to embarrass them in appropriatingPatterson's property to their debts
by the claim which Riddle was to make
upon it.
When a person gratuituously conveys
his land to another for the purpose of
evading his creditors, the law treats the
conveyance as absolute, and refuses to hear
evidence of the illicit trust, for the purpose
of assisting the grantor to recover the
land from the grantee. Zuverv. Clark, 104
Pa. 222; Reichart v. Castator, 5 Binn. 109.
The same principle allows a mortgagee
to enforce the mortgage, Gill v. Henry, 95
Pa. 388, or the holder of a judgment note,
the note, Harbaugh v. Butner, 148 Pa. 273,
despite the effort of the mortgagor or maker
of the note to show that it was made solely
to protect his land from creditors. It
would logically follow that when the judgt
ment was entered on the note, and a
sheriff's sale took place, the plaintiff
therein becoming the purchaser, the land
could not be recovered from him, by showing that the note on which the judgment
was entered was given on his promise to
causejudgment to be entered and asheriff's
sale to be had, merely in order to exempt
the land thus sold, from appropriation by
the defendant's creditors to their debts.
Shank v. Simpson, 114 Pa. 208.
The agreement of the payee in the note
when its aim is to cheat creditors,is wholly
unenforceable against him, hence, the circumstance that Riddle entered the judgment on the note before debts caie into
existence can have no legal result. The
note was evidence of the absolute obliga-
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tion of Pattersontopay$5,000. When later

the judgment was entered, and the land
was sold on the execution thereon, and
$5,000 paid from the proceeds to Riddle,
precisely that was done to which, legally
interpreted, the contract secured to the
latter a right.
Patterson has been able to pay and has
paid all his debts. But, the right of the
fraudulent grantee to retain, as against
the grantor, the land conveyed does not
depend on the existence of creditors whom
the conveyance has ultimately defrauded.
Creditors can deprive the grantee of the
land by execution in order to satisfy their
demands. But, their power is not communicated to the grantor. His disdharging their claims, does not subrogate him to
their rights. As soon as made, and for all
subsequent time, the conveyance is irreversible by him. It follows that Patterson
cannot recover.
Judgment affirmed.
HARRY KNOX vs. AARON MASONJOHN KNOX vs. AARON MASON.
Negligence of employer-Parents right to
damages for loss of services of childInfant's suits.
SHREVE and MITCHELL for plaintiff.

1. Employer must warn and instruct
young and inexperienced servants, must
take notice of their age and ability, and
must use ordinary care to protect them
from risks. Kiehler v. Schwenk, 151 Pa.
519; Pummel v. Dilwith, 131 Pa. 509;
Tagg v. McGeorge, et al. 155 Pa. 368.
2. Parent may sue for damages for loss
of services of his child and for expenses of
medical treatment. Wilton v. Middlesex
R. R. Co., 125 Mass. 130; Klingman

'.

Holmes, 54 Mo. 304; Magee v. Holland,
27 N. J. 86.
VALENTINE and FRANK for the defendant.
1. An infant must bring suit in his
name through his next friend or guardian.
A. & E. Encyc., volume 10, p. 680; Heft
v. McGill, 3 Pa. 256; Carksadden v. McGhee, 7 W. & S., 140; Fox v. Minor, 32
Cal. 111; Jenningsv. Collins, 99 Mass. 29;
Jeffrie v. Robideaux, 3 Mo. 33;
2. An employe not using ordinary careand observation, both in undertaking and
carrying out orders, cannot hold his employer liable for resulting injury. Kaufhold v. Arnold, 163 Pa. 269, 279.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Harry Knox is seventeen years old. In
October 1898, John Knox, his father, hired
him to Aaron Mason, a farmer, until April
last, for his board, the boy to go to school
and assist mornings and evenings in the
work around the barn. Harry was feebleminded to such an extent that he would
be likely to carry out any orders, if he
possibly could, without considering his
own interests. He was also not very
strong physically. The father informed
Mason of Harry's condition at the time
that he hired him. Last February when
the thermometer was ten to fifteen degrees below zero, the coldest day of the
winter, Mason sentHarry and a full grown,
robust hired man toa mountain abouttwo
or three miles from his home to cut and
haul wood. All the wood thatwas needed
for the year could be cut and hauled in
one day, and the work given them was
sufficient to occupy them from 9:30 A. M.
to 3:30 P. M., which time they spent on
the mountain. When they returned it
was discovered that Harry's left foot was
frozen to such an extent that all of the
toes have since been amputated. The
hired man had two of his fingers frostbitten, but not so seriously.
Harry and his father both brought
actions for damages. The court non-suited
both cases. Motion to take off non-suit.
OPINION OF COURT.

A motion is here made to take off the
non-suits entered against Harry Knox
and John Knox, his father, in their action
for damages against Aaron Mason, the employer of the son.
Where there is an injury to the person
of an infant by the tortious act of another
two causes of action may arise,-one in
favor of the parent for loss of' services,
and one in favor of the infant for the injury to his person. Tiffany on domestic
relations, page 404.
From the statement of facts it would
seem that the action by Harry Knox, a
minor, was brought in his own name.
This, the defendant contends, justifies a
continuance of the non-suit ; but while it
is well settled that an infant cannot bring
suit in his own name, yet this is a matter
which must be pleaded in abatement.
Heft v. McGill, 3 Pa, 256, while not an
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analogous case, involves similar principles,
and it is there said: "Nor is infancy a
ground for a non-suit. It must be pleaded
in abatement. Also the same in Schemerhorn v. Jenkins, 7 Johns. 373.
This brings us to the merits of the case.
First, was there negligence on the part of
the defendant? Second, was there contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiffs? Third, is the damage to the
plaintiffs sufficiently certain to justify a
verdict? Or was there such doubt upon
these points as to send the questions to the
jury? When an action is brought to recover damages for personal injuries, the
plaintiff must make out a case of negligence on the part of the defendant, free
from any contributory negligence of his
own.
Was Aaron Mason, the defendant in
this case, guilty of negligence? In
Rummel v. Dilworth, 131 Pa. 509, it was
said: " In the case of young persons, it
is the duty of their employer to take notice
of their age and ability, and to use ordinary care to protect them from risks which
they cannot properly appreciate, and to
which they should not be exposed."
Whether the defendant, Aaron Mason,
exercised due prudence in his relation to
Harry Knox, his employe, we think is a
question which should have been left to
the jury. Kehlerv. Schwenk, 151 Pa. 505.
In the original case of Rummel v. Dilworth, 111 Pa. 343, both non-suits were
taken off the actions of the father and son
under principles similar to those in this
case.
As to contributory negligence,-we do
not think there was any negligence upon
the part of John Knox, the father, in
emancipating his son. The contract stipulations between him and Mason were but
natural and reasonable, and such as, under
the circumstances, would likely be advantageous to all parties concerned.
Nor do we consider that Harry Knox
was guilty of contributory negligence. It
is true that an employe is supposed to use
due care and not execute commandswhich
he, in good faith, thinks are likely to injure him ; butall the circumstanc.es of the
case must be considered. While boys of
the age of the plaintiffare ordinarily supposed to have sufficient knowledge of the
nature of the elements to protect them-

selves, yet Harry Knox was weak-minded,
and to such an extent that "he would be
likely to carry out any orders if he possibly
considerable departure from
could "-a
the normal mental state of modern serYants-and this, of course, makes the case
an exception. At all events, these questions should have been left to the jury.
"Only when the plaintifPs testimony
clearly shows his concurrent negligence
may the court order a non-suit on that
ground." Lee v. Woolsey, 109 Pa. 124.
Little need be said on the question of
damages. Sedgwick on damages, p. 167.
There is no doubt in the case of the son.
The father may recover for loss of services
-the son not having been emancipated
for the whole period of his minority.
Mohry v. Hoffman, 86 Pa. 358. While
the value of these services cannot be absolutely determined, yet they are sufficiently certain to justify a verdict.
The non-suit is, therefore, in both cases
taken off.
SELLERS, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

Harry Knox is a minor, seventeen years
old. Strictly, the action should have been
brought in his name, by a next friend.
The non-joinder of a prochein ami, however, beingmatter for a plea in abatement,
cannot be a cause for a non-suit, or adverse
verdict on the merits.
The important question is whether the
evidence is such as to require submission
to a jury. Harry Knox in the performance of his task, has suffered a serious injury. Is Aaron Mason responsible for it?
He selected the task, and the day. He
issued the command to Harry, with the
expectation that it would be obeyed. It
was in fact obeyed. Whether it would be
careless to expose one's self, or another
over whom one had control, to the severe
cold, for six hours, on the day on which
the injury was received, the jury should
say. The court could not as matter of law,
say that such exposure was not negligent.
But, could Mason be properly said to
have exposed Knox? He gave the command, it is true, but might he not have
expected Knox to exercise some discretion
as to obeying? Whether he might or not
the jury should determine. Knox was
feeble-minded. He had a morbid deference fbr those in authority over him, and
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neither intelligence to discover that their
orders were impracticable, nor will to refuse to comply with them. At least the
evidence would warrant the jury in so inferring. If such should be the inference,
the responsibility of Mason would follow,
we think, as a natural consequence. He
had reason to believe that his command
would be followed by unquestioning obedience, because of the imperfect mind and
will of the boy. If the command had
been given to an ordinarily'intelligent and
independent person, he would obey or not,
as he chose, and would assume on himself
the consequences. The casual connection
between the mischief and the initial commaud would be broken by the volition of
this person. But, the mind and will of
Harry Knox would no more be an independent cause, if the jury should find as
facts, what the plaintiff contends to be inferrible, than the mind and will of a horse
or cow, lured or driven to its hurt, by a
command or a solicitation from a man.
If a young child five years of age, were
told to go out, on such a day and remain
out for six hours, it would hardly be contended that the adult who issued the command would not be chargeable with the
deplorable results. How far above those of
a normal child, five years old, the will and
knowledge of Harry Knox were, and
whether so far as to make him the cause,
and not Mason, of the disaster, only the
jury could say.
It
is hardly necessary to consider
whether therewas contributory negligence
on the part of the plaintiff. The same
causes that would make his acts negligent
would remove all negligence from the conduct of Mason. An order to a sufficiently intelligent and self-assertive person can
never make him answerable that gives it.
When an employer sets an employe to a
task in a dangerous place, with dangerous
machinery, and the employe has a full
knowledge of the danger, he, being a free
agent, cannot carry beyond himself responsibility for the results. If the employe is ignorant of the facts that would
have deterred him from undergoing the
risk, the employer becomes liable. If
Knox had had ordinary intelligence and
self-reliance, he would have known that
exposure for six hours to a cold fifteen de-

grees below zero, would be riskful, and he
would have determined whether to expose
himself or not, by consideration of his
own interest. What is to be determined
in this case is, whether the danger from so
great cold was known to Knox; whether,
if he did not know it, his ignorance was
known to Mason, and even if he did
know, his feeble-mindedness made him
helpless to withstand the authority of
Mason's order. The court cannot determine that the jury could not legitimately
infer, from the evidence, that Knox was
in this mental and volitional helplessness,
and that Mason was cognizant of it.
There was no precise evidence concerning the damages suffered by Knox. But,
the jury may, as ordinary men, know that
the loss of one's toes by frost, is an evil of
not less than a certain minimum magnitude, and allow a money compensation for
it. They would know the destruction of
the tissues by frost, and the amputation
following, would involve a serious amount
of pain, for which compensation should be
made. They would know that the nimbleness and walking power of the patient
would be injured. We see no just reason
for withdrawing the case from the jury.
What has been said will show that we
also think that there was no error in submitting the case of John Knox v. Aaron
Mason to the jury.
Judgment affirmed.
CATHARINE GRIFFIN vs. GEORGE
and THOS. GRIFFIN.
Widow must contribute with heirs in raising mortgage-Apportionment of expense of redeeming mortgagemay be had
underwrit of sci. fa.
LIGim and SEBRrNG for plaintiff.
CLRxK and M. R. MYERs for defendant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

George Griffin conveyed land to John
Toan, taking a mortgage for $5,000 for onehalf of the purchase. Griffin assigned onethird of the mortgage to Hooper Jones.
Subsequently Toan reconveyed the premises to Griffin. Griffin then died and the
widow Catharine bought from Jones his
share in the mortgage. She issues this
sci. fa. claiming to collect what she paid
Jones.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

George Griffin c9nveyed land to John
Toan, taking a mortgage for $5,000 for onehalf of the purchase money. Griffin, assigned one-third of mortgage to rooper
Jones. Subsequently Toan reconveyed
the premises to Griffin. Griffin then died
and his widow Catharine bought from
Jones his share in the mortgage. She issues this sci. fa. claiming to collect what
she paid to Jones.
In the trial of this case, there did not
appear any irregularity or dispute in any
of the transactions to which Griffin, Sr.,
Toan, or Jones are parties. There is but
one question to be decided and that is
Can Catharine Griffin recover from George
and Thomas Griffin, the heirs of George
Griffin, on a sci.fa. the amount of money
she paid to ooper Jones for the mortgage. What that amount is, does not appear, but we do not believe that whether
the amount is equal to or less than the
mortgage, the decision is affected in any
degree.
In support of their position the counsel
for the plaintiff argued that since it does
not appear that any will has been made
giving Catharine Griffin an estate in the
land or that her dower has been set out to
her, she is in the position of a stranger toward the heirs--occupying no other relation than that of an assignee of the mortgagee of the land. This argument is incorrect. It does not appear that a will
had been made. Therefore we must infer
there is none, and the land passes by the
intestate, laws giving the widow dower,
which is an estate in the land. Kunselman v. Stine, 183 Pa. 1; McGovern v. Bailey, 179 Pa. 470; and Helfrich v. Weaver,
61 Pa. 3&5. Which estate vests in her at
the moment of her husband's death. Gourley v. Kinley, 66 Pa. 270, and Bachman v.
Chrisman, 23 Pa. 162. Catharine Griffin,
then, is a tenant in common of this land
with George and Thomas Griffin, Weaver
v. Wible, 25 Pa. 270, and Borschell's Estate, 40 L. I. 141.
The rule is firmly established in Pennsylvania by numerous decisions that,
"where several persons have a joint or
common interest in an estate, one of them
may not purchase an encumbrance or outstanding title and set it up against the
rest for the purpose of depriving them of

their interests." An able and iomplete
discussion of this rule is found in Tanney
v. Tanney, 159 Pa. 277, by Justice Dean.
Of the many other decisions on this point,
we call attention to a few, which we deem
strongest and most applicable to this case:
Meyer's Appeal, 2 Pa. 463; Weaver v.
Wible, 25 Pa. 270; Keller v. Auble, 58 Pa.
410; and Fisher v. Hartman, 165 Pa. 16,
where it was held that "One of several
tenants in common cannot purchase a
mortgage upon the land held in common,
and set it up against his co-tenants for the
purpose of depriving them of their interest."
But it may be argued that the rule deduced from these cases does not apply to
the case at bar because the mortgage is not
"set up against the rest for the purpose of
depriving them of their interest." We do
not believe that this phrase was ever intended to mean that there must be in
every case, a purpose hostile to the interests of the co-tenants; but that a hostile
purpose will be conclusively presumed from
the acquisition and suit of an adverse interest by one of the tenants in common.
This is the construction given in ChorpenningsAppeal, 32 Pa. 316, by Thompson,
J., who says :-"This rule Is inflexible
without regard to the consideration paid
or honesty of intent." The mere fact that
the enforcement of the mortgage might
affect seriously the interests of the heirs is
sufficient to bring the case within the
operation of this rule.
The proper remedy for Catharine Griffin
would have been a bill in equity to enforce
contribution from the heirs to the extent
of their interest. Weaver v. Wible, supra;
Tanney v. Tanuey, _pra.
The action as maintained in this suit is
improperly brought. The defendant in
the scire facias is the mortgagor, or, he
being dead, his personal representative.
1 Trickett on Liens, Page 185; Tryon v.
Munson, 77 Pa. 250; Megargel v. Megargel,
105 Pa. 47.5; Roberts v. Williams, 5 Wh.
170; and Cadmus v. Jackson, 52 Pa. 295.
Therefore, judgment is given for the defendants.
ISAIAH SCHEELINE, J.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
When Toan reconveyed the premises to
George Griffin, the one-third of the toi tgage, $1,666.66, remained a charge on them,
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In favor of Jones, the assignee. With respectto the other two-thirds, the mortgage
became extinct, because Griffin united in
himself the ownership of them, and of the
premises.
When Griffin died, he was
owner of the land with the charge of
$1,666.66 upon it.
The administrator should have paid this
$1,666.66, but, he not doing so, Catharine
Griffin, the widow, has paid and taken an
assignment of it. Although the dowress
is not, strictly, a tenant in common with
the heirs, prior to the assignment of dower,
Pringle v. Gaw, 5 S. & R. 536; Bratton v.
Mitchell, 7 W. 113; Seider v. Seider, 5 Wh.
208; Gourley v. Rinley, 66 Pa. 270, she
holds doubtless, towards the heirs a position in important respects similar to that of
one tenant in common to another. As one
tenant in common cannot purchase a lien
on the common property, and, by means
of it sell that property, without giving the
co-tenants an opportunity to contribute to
the sum paid for it, and thus save their interest from divestiture, neither can a widow. Hite v. Hite, 21 Pa. C. C. 97.
The heirs, who as terre-tenants, are
making a defepce, have not shown that
they have offered to pay to the use of
plaintiff what they equitably should. Nor
do they now make such an offer. The sci.
fa. on a mortgage is a substitute for a bill
in equity to foreclose. Equitable principles
are as well applied under it, as under a bill.
The court may find to what extent the
mortgage is to be deemed satisfied, on account of the use-plaintifi's duty to contribute to it, and enter a judgment against
the terre-tenants for their proper shares of
the residue. While therefore the court
below has recognized the principle upon
which the rights of the parties are to be apportioned, it has erred in determining that
the apportionment cannot take place in the
present action.
Judgment reversed, and veniref. d. novo
awarded.

MARTIN BEST vs. JOSIAH ANDERSON.

Sendthrift rust.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Bradwell died leaving to survive
him a son Henry. His will contained the
following clause: "I give to Josiah Anderson and his heirs my mansion farm in
trust., that he will lease it and pay over the
rents to my son Henry, or to any one whom
he may appoint to receive them, or if
Josiah Anderson thinks best to allow my
son Henry to live upon the farm during
his natural life. But the farm and its proceeds shall be for Henry's benefit, and not
be liable for his debts, engagements or contracts. After my son Henry's death the
farm shall be held in trust for his children,
their heirs and assigns forever." At the
time. of John Bradweli's death, Henry
Bradwell had contracted debts. He afterwards contracted more. Henry Bradwell
then died, leaving two children to survive
him. At his death the trustee, Josiah
Anderson, had in his hands $1,723, rents
received from the farm. An administrator, Martin Best, was appointed at the instance of the creditors, who claimed the
$1,723 from the trustee for the purpose of
applying it to the debts. Anderson resisted, claiming that the money was not
liable to debts, and was payable to the
children of Henry Bradwell.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

It would seem that the question involved
in this caseis one of ownership. To whom
do the accumulated profits in the hands
of the trustee of Henry Bradwell belong
-to the children of the deceased, or to the
administrator appointed at the instance of
the creditors? The answer to this question is involved in the further one,
whether the principles of law generally
recognized as applicable to spendthrift
trusts apply here.
On the part of Josiah Anderson, the
trustee, it is contended that it was the
intention of the testator to create a
spendthrift trust, and as such, this case
is ruled by a long line of cases from
Fisher v. Taylor, 2 Rawle 33, down to the
present time. Counsel for the administra-
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tor of the creditors admit the desire of the
father to protect the son against his own
improvidence, but deny the application of
the cases cited in support of the spendthrift trust theory.
There is a clear intention to create a
spendthrift trust, and we believe such a
trust has been formed. But admitting
the existence of the trust, does it, after the
death of the cestui que trust, continue to
protect the profits accumulated during his
lifetime, aid is the efficacy of the trust destroyed by reason of the alternative provision, which seemingly gives Henry
Bradwell the power of disposition? As
these questions are answered the case must
be decided.
The first question we think answered affirmatively in Huber's appeal, 80 Pa. 358.
In this case Henry Gaul, Sr., directed that
his real and all his residuary personal estate should be in the hands of his executors during his wife's life. Upon her
death he gave one-eighth to Jacob for life,
and after his death to his children living,
their heirs and assigns forever; provided
that the share of Jacob should remain in
the care of the executors as his trustee,
the income during his life "to be paid to
him, so that the same shall notbeliable to
his disposal or subject to the -payment of
his debts." Jacob Gauldied. Therewere
accretions as the result of unpaid income.
His administrator claimed them. The
trustees resisted and were sustained. The
decision of the lower court was affirmed
by Mr. Justice Woodward on the authority
of Howitz v. Norris, 13 Wright 213, to
which he refers as having "definitely determined" the principle.
We must answer the second question in
the negative. Not to do so would be to
disregard the express intention of the testator, expose his bounty to any debt the
cestui que trust may contract, and thus destroy in toto the trust. In 139 Pa. 283,words
similar to these of the disputed will were
held as merely "showing a recognition of
his right to appoint an agent to receive
the income to his use, and not to enable
him to transfer his right thereto to another,
or otherwise dispose of the income in anticipation of payment to himself."
The administrator can get possession of
the accumulated rents on the theory that

Henry Bradwell owned them and at his
death the ownership passed to his estate
under the law governing the descent of an
intestate's property-the realty to the
heirs, the personalty to the administrator.
We can not accept this view of the case.
While it may be admitted that the control
over the income by the trustee was merely
to prevent its diversion during the lifetime of Henry, yet, we believe, that ownership can only pass to the cestui que trust
when the trustee has made an actual transfer. 80 Pa. 359. Until this transfer Henry
Bradwell could not have assigned or transferred by will the $1,723. No such payment or transfer was ever made. The
money remained in the hands of the trustee, and must go with the body of the estate to the children of Henry Bradwell.
RUBY R. VALE,J.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.

The phraseology of the will of John
Bradwell is almost identical with that of
the will of Alexander Mlehaffey, which
was held to create a spendthrift trust, in
Mehaffey's estate, 139 Pa. 276. It was
there decided that an order by the cestui
que trust upon the trustee to pay $250 to a
creditor who, for a debt created before the
origin of the trust, had obtained a judgment, imposed no duty on the trustee to
pay the money to the creditor. By both
wills the farm was given to X in trust, to
lease it, and pay over the rents to a son, or
to such person as he might appoint to receive them ; or, at the option of X, to allow the son to occupy the farm during his
life. In both it is said that the proceeds
of the farm shall be for the son's use, and
not liable for his debts, engagements or
contracts, and in both, after the son's
death, the farm is to be held in trust for
others; for his heirs in the Mehaffey will,
and for his children and their heirs in the
Bradwell will.
It is not expressly said by John Bradwell that the trustee is to have a discretion as to the portion of the rent, which
he is to pay to the son, Henry. Doubtless
he could, in a sound discretion, spend
some of itinmaking repairs, payingtaxes,
and procuring necessary services to the
land. Probably he had no right to retain
any of the rental, because of an opinion
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that the son ought not to have the use of
all of it. But however this might be,
"the farm and its proceeds shall be for
Henry's benefit, and not be liable for his
debts, engagements and contracts."
Whether chattels purchased by Henry
with the rents paid him would be liable
to execution for his debts, it is needless to
consider. Certainly the rents, while yet
in the hands of Anderson, the trustee,
could not be attached. Nor is this exemption confined to the life of Henry.
The proceeds of the farm during his life,
were for his benefit; but, whatever was
for his benefit was not liable for his debts.
The farm was not liable, the proceeds
were not liable. The plaintiff, asadministrator of Henry, is claiming them. This
claim reposes on the assumption that the
$1,723 of rents were liable for debts.
Whatever would entitle the administrator
to receive it, would entitle creditors to
share in it. "The provision that it shall
not be liable for any of his debts" forbids
that it should go to the administrator.
Horwitz v. Norris, 49 Pa. 213 ; 222; Huber's Appeal, 80 Pa. 348. These cases, cited
by the learned court below, sustain the
conclusion reached by it. Whoever may
be entitled, whether next of kin, as such,
of Henry, or the remaindermen, as such,
it is clear that the administrator is not entitled. It follows that the court below
correctly directed a verdict for the defendant.
The Act of 1853, forbidding directions to
accumulate proceeds, has no application.
The Bradwell will does not direct accumulations. The fact that the trustee did
permit the rents to accumulate, is entirely
immaterial, so far as the Act of 1853 is
concerned.
Judgment affirmed.

JOSEPH HARPER, ET AL., vS.
SARAH HARPER.
Co-tenants-tenant in possession accountable for rents and profits to other cotenants.
ROTHERMEL for plaintiff.
A tenant in common in possession is
bound to account for the rents and profits
to the remaining co-tenants. Keiser v.
Earnest, 21 Pa. 90; Pott v. Lesher, 1 Yeates

578; Henwood v. Cheeseman, 3 S. & R.
500 ; P. & L. Dig. Sup. 1895, page 599.
McDoNALD and BROOKS for defendant.
One tenant in common holding by consent, the others cannot call for an accounting for rents unless there has been
an express agreement. Kline v. Jacobs,
68 Pa. 57.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Farm land descended from their father
under the intestate laws to four children
-three sons and a daughter-in December,
1895. Since that time, the daughter, who
took care of her father during his last illness, has been in possession of the property. The sons have never requested her
to make a partition. There is evidence,
however, that at one time two of the sons
found a purchaser, but the terms were unsatisfactory to the other son and the
daughter, consequently the sale was not
made. In December, 1898, the two brothers who had found the purchaser, filed a
bill in equity for partition, and in the bill
sought to charge the daughter with rent
since 1895. The master has allowed the
plaintiff's claim for three year's rent. Exceptions to the Master's report.
oPINiON OF THE COURT.
By the death of the father, the children
were entitled to possession of the land as
tenants in common, each to an undivided"
one-fourth, because, as says the Commentator, "none knoweth his own severalty,
therefore they all occupy promiscuously."
At common law, in order that a co-tenant
could be held personally liable for rent
through his own use and occupation of
the land, it was necessary to show a special
agreement to that effect; otherwise he
could not be charged, as he was merely exercising one of his rights of ownership.
By the statute of 4 Anne c. 16 s. 27, the
rule was somewhat altered, and it was
there provided that one tenant in common
could maintain an action of account
against a co-tenant as "bailiff for receiving more than comes to his just share and
proportion." Parke, B., in interpreting
this clause of the statute held that "for
receiving more than his just share or proportion" applied to cases, not where one
co-tenant held exclusive possession of the
land without the kniowledge or against the
will of his co-tenant, but where one co-tenant received from a third party compensa-
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tion forthe use of the land. Where, however, one tenantin common holds exclusive
possession by means of an unequivocal
ouster, his co-tenants can maintain an
action of trespass against him.
When we examine the cases in Pennsylvania on the question of the liability of a
tenant in common, in possession, to pay
rent to his co-tenants, we find the authorities strangely and hopelessly at variance.
In Keisel v. Earnest, 21 Pa. 90, an action
in trover for carrying away a portion of
the plaintifft s crops, the Supreme Court
says: "The result of the evidence is that
Earnest was a tenant in common in possession and bound to account for the rents
and profits to his co-tenants." In Gillies
v. McKinney, 6 W. & S. 78, the co-tenant
in possession had made an express promise
to pay, hence a recovery was allowed

against him. Borrel v. Borrel, 33 Pa. 492,
permitted a recovery on the ground of an
implied promise and this decision was followed in Haggerly v. McGeever, 5 Kulp
463. That "equity will compel one of
several heirs who has had sole possession
of real estate owned by them in common
to account to his co-tenants for their proportion" is the doctrine laid down by Chief
Justice Sterrett in Clayton v. McKay, 143
Pa. 237, decided in 1890. No Pennsylvania authorities, however, are quoted to
sustain the proposition; not even on
counsel's brief as cited in the report, for it
contains references only to Virginia and
Arkansas cases, and 4 Kent, 365. Tenants
in common who occupied part of the realty
were charged with rental of the premises
in Spellbrink's estate, 15 C. Ct. 506. The
charge was made, however, by virtue of
their having been trustees of the property,
so that the case cannot be considered as an
authority on the point before us. In 1886
the question again came before the Supreme Court in Luck v. Luck, 113 Pa. 256,
on appeal from decision of the court below
allowing a charge for rent against a cotenant, and by a divided court, three for
and three against, the lower tribunal was
sustained. This case was followed in 1895
by that of the Winton Coal Co. v. Pancoast Coal Co., 170 Pi. 437. The trial judge
ruled that assumpsit was not the proper
remedy and directed a verdict for the defendant. Says the Chief Justice, "We
think the learned court erred in holding

that, in the circumstances, an action of
assumpsit could not be maintained."
After citing a number of authorities to
show that the Statute of Anne has been
given a liberal construction by the courts,
on account of its obsolete machinery, and
that assumpsit has gradually superseded
account in popular favor, he continues:
"Where the co-tenant has actually received the rent of the common property
there would seem to be no good reason
why in a proper case he may not be sued
for his co-tenants' share thereof."
Yet, reasonable as it seems from a perusal of the foregoing authorities, to thus
charge a co-tenant in exclusive possession,
we find a number of cases by high authorities, supporting the opposite conclusion. Thus, in Kline v. Jacobs, 68 Pa. 57,
the syllabus lays down the doctrine that
"a tenant in common cannot recover in
assumpsit against his fellow for the use and
occupation of the common property without an express promise to pay." Probably
the best discussion of this intricate and
perplexing problem is found in Norris v.
Gould, 15 W. N. C. 187, where a bill in
equity was filed " praying that the defendant be required to state an account of
the rents, etc., and occupation rent accruing to the plaintiff." Adopting Kline v.
Jacobs, "supra, as authoritative, Judge
Thayer held that unless the action is
brought in the form required by the
Statute of Anne there can be no recovery,
and consequently that Borrel v. Borrel
must be considered as over-ruled. Speaking of their rights by a bill in equity he
applies the maxim, "aequitas soquitur
legum," and says, that inasmuch as there
is an appropriate remedy at law the request
of the petitioners as set forth in the bill
must be refused. The latest authority in
point is that of the Gas Co. v. Transit
Co., 172 Pa. 425, assumpsit to recover royalties on an oil lease, decided in January,
1896, by Mr. Justice Mitchell, wherein it
was held that "assumpsit can only be
maintained by one co-tenant against another on an express promise to pay rent or
to account." A few months prior to this
the Legislature passed an act giving to
tenants in common not in possession the
right to sue a co-tenant in possession for
"his or their proportionate part of the
rental value of said real estate for thd time
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such real estate shall have been in possession as aforesaid ; and in case of partition
the parties in possession shall have deducted from their distributive shares of said
real estate the rental value thereof to
which their co-tenant or tenants are entitled." June 24, 1895, P. L. 237, S. 1,
thus, we hope, terminating this unfortunate difference of opinion between the law
interpretaters of the Commonwealth. We
can understand how, on principles of constitutional law, this statute might have
been inapplicable to the case just cited ;
yet we regret that the Supreme Court did
not refer to it in rendering its opinion.
However, since the rights of the parties in
the suit before us vested subsequent to the
passage of the act, and as it is so clear and
explicit in its terms, we have no hesitation
in applying it.
Exceptions dismissed.
GEo. W. COLES, P. J.
OPINIOX OF SUPERIOR COURT.

Of several co-tenants one may choose to
take, while the others choose to refrain
from taking possession of the land owned
in common. If he take it, and excludes
the others from possession, the latter may
recover a joint possession by the action of
ejectment, and, either in that action, or in
a later trespass, may as mesne profits, recoVer compensation for the deprivation of
the possession. Lane v. Harrold, 72 Pa.
267; Norris v. Gould, 15 W. N. C. 187;
Gas Co. v. Transit Co. 172Pa. 421. Neither
may take possession, and a stranger may
occupy the land. If such occupant pays
rent to one co-tenant, whom his fellow-owner has expressly authorized to receive his share, as bailiff, the latter may
maintain an action of account-render to
compel the former, his bailiff, to account;
Kline v. Jacobs, 68 Pa. 57; Norris v. Gould,
supra; Gas Co. v. Transit Co. supra. In
no other case at common law could one
tenant in common recover any part of
rents and profits received by the other,
whether directly from the land as occupant, or from a tenant in possession.
The statute of 4 Anne C. 16, section 27,
enabled one tenant in common to maintain account-render against the other, " as
bailiff for receiving more than his just
share or proportion," although he had not
been, as at common law he had to be, ex-

pressly constituted bailiff. But the "receiving" meant, in this statute, was a receiving, not directly from the land, as occupant, but from a third person in possession. Such istheinterpretation of Thayer.
J., in Norris v. Gould, supra,the "admirabl:' clear and accurate opinion," in which
is pronounced by Mitchell, J., in Oil Co.
v. Transit Co., supra,to be "the best summary of the law in our own books."
"Neither at common law, nor under any
statute,' Sharswood, J., %vasable to write
in 1871, "could assumpsit for use and occupation be maintained upon the mere occupation ; though it might be shown to be
permissive. Each tenant has an equal
right to the possession of the whole, and
without an express contract to pay rent,
account was the only remedy under the
statute of Anne." Kline v. Jacobs, 68 Pa.
57.
In Luck v. Luck, 113 Pa. 256, six judges
sitting, three were of opinion that the
tenant not in possession could recover his
share of the profits from the tenant in
posseskson, in the absence of any contract,
while three adhered to the rule of Kline
v. Jacobs. Gas Co. v. Transit Co. indicates
that the court, as composed in 1896, has
adopted anew, this rule.
Against Kline v. Jacobs, there is as far
as we have discovered, but one decision,
that of Borrell v. Borrell, 33 Pa. 492, which
the later case, although not referring to it,
must .be considered to have overruled.
Norris v. Gould, 15 W. N. C. 187 ; Gas Co.
v. Transit Co. 172 Pa. 421. In Gillis v.
McKinney, 6 W. & S. 78, one tenant in
common had received rent from a lessee
from both, and, moreover, had expressly
promised to pay to the other tenant-incommon his share. Cf. Norris v. Gould.
On the express promise, assumpsit could,
of course, be maintained; Kline v. Jacobs,
and, under the statute of Anne, the cotenant, receiving more than his "just
share or proportion," could have been
compelled to account, although not expressly constituted bailiff. The two cotenants in possession, in Spellbrink's estate, 15 Pa. C. C. 506, had the legal title
in trust for themselves and others, and
were held liable to account, not as fellow
co-tenants, but as trustees. There was in
Clayton v. MeCay, 143 Pa. 225, an agreement of the tenanth in common who took
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possession, to pay rent to their fellow.
In Winton Coal Co. v. Pancoast Coal Co.,
170 Pa. 437, the tenant-in-common extracted coal from the land and sold it.
The coal was a portion of the corpus of
the estate in common, and after extraction,
as before, continued to be owned in common. When then, it was sold by the cotenant in possession, the others were held
entitled to recover by assumpsit their share
of the proceeds. Sterrett, J., expressly
says that the case does not involve the
question presented in Luck v. Luck, 113
Pa. 256, viz., the duty of a tenant of farm
land, in possession, to account to the other
co-tenant, for a portion of the crops.
The crops, unlike coal, timber, oil, gas or
other. minerals, are not a part of the soil.
The remarks by Mitchell, J., Baker v.
Lewis, 160 Pa. 2-51, where some co-tenants
had leased the land, that "they and perhaps he (the lessee) might be liable to account for plaintiff's (the other co-tenant's)
share of the profits," is mere dictum.
The leasing co-tenant had been in adverse
possession of the land, and could be compelled to pay mesne profits to the excluded
co-tenant.
The result of this investigation, as of
that of the learned court below, is, that
the plaintiff has no right to recover rent
from the defendant, unless that right has
been conferred on him by the Act of June
24,1895. The Act was passed before the possession of Sarah Harper began, and
hence, applied to it. The Act ordains in all
cases in which land is held in common, and
one or more of the owners are in possession, it shall be lawful for those not in possession "to sue for and recover from such
tenants in possession, his or their proportionate part of the rental value" of the
land. It also directs that in partition proceedings the parties in possession shall
have deducted from their distributive
shares in the land the rental value thereof,
to which their co-tenants are entitled.
This language needs no comment. It
plainly entitled John Harper to recover
from his sister, in the partition proceedings, one-half of the "rental value" of
the premises, for the period of her sole occupancy.
Judgment affirmed.

JAMES HARRISON vs. JANE
HARRISON.
Husband and wife-No action in tort between.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Harrison had five bonds of the Atlantic
National Insurance Company, each for
$1,000, and left them in a safe to which
he and his wife Jane alone had access.
Jane, without his authority, took the
bonds from the safe, and pretending to
have his authority, sold them to John
Shoap for $4,000. They were worth in the
market $5,000. Jane Harrison gave the
$4,000 to a son by a former husband, who
went to Australia with it. This action of
trover is brought by the plaintiff against
his wife to recover the damages from the
taking.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question in this case is whether a
husband can maintain an action against
his wife for a tort committed against him
during coverture. At common law he
could not, nor could the wife bring an
action against him. It follows, therefore,
than any and all rights which the husband has to sue or be sued by his wife are
conferred by statute, and such statutes are
not presumed to alter the common law
further or otherwise than is clearly declared. The first Act of Assembly which
we have on the subject is the Act of 1848,
which protects the property of the wife
from husband's creditors, but does not authorize suits between husband and wife.
Neither does the Act of 1887, though it
gives to the wife power to commence and
maintain actions in her own name against
third persons. His ability to sue, if he
has such, is granted by the third section
of the Act of June 8, 1893, 2 P. & L. Dig.
2,905, which, after enumerating the cases
in which suits are permitted by the wife
against the husband, continues: "Nor
may he sue her except in a proceeding for
divorce, or in a proceeding to protect or
recover his separate property, whensoever
she may have deserted him, or separated
herself from him without sufficient cause."
It is contended by counsel for the plaintiff
that the clause limiting the right to sue to
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"whensoever she may have deserted him,
etc.," should be ignored for the reason that
it destroys all remedy for a violation of
the separate rights of wife (by implication
husband also). We think not. For as
was said by the court in Walker v. Reamy,
36 Pa. 410, in reference to a separate property Act: "As the only object of this Act
was to afford a protection to the estates of
married women, we may assume that it
was not intended that she should so fully
own her separate property as to impair the
intimacy of the marriage relation. It was
not intended to declare that her property
should be so separate that her husband
could be guilty of larceny of it, or liable in
trespass or trover for taking a dish or a
chair, or using it without her consent."
A similar ruling was made by Judge
Mitchell in Small v. Small, 129 Pa. 374, in
reference to the manner in which statutes
shall be interpreted. It is clear that the
legislature did.not intend that actions between husband and wife while living together should be authorized, and as there
is no evidence of a desertion or separation
the conditions for bringing an action do
not exist. Trumbell v. Trumbell, 3 Forum 124.
Judgment is, therefore, entered in favor
of the defendant.
Wm. M. FLANNIGAN, 1. J
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The opinion of the learned court below
so well justifies itself that it is unnecessary
for us to indulge in any discussion of the
case.
Judgment affirmed.

son. His claim is $500. Payne paid $209
upon his subscription, and the eight other
shareholders had also paid in but twenty
per cent. The company might have called
in the rest, but has never done so. Another creditor obtained a judgment by the
execution of which all the property of the
company was levied on and sold. Jackson
then filed this bill in equity to compel
Payne to pay to him $500 on account of
his unpaid stock. Payne demurs.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This action has been instituted against
but a single stockholder. There has been
no joinder of the company. It is urged
by the defendant that the corporation
should have been made party defendant
in this proceeding, and that the failure to
do so is fatal to the ability of the plaintiff
to maintain his action. Manifestly, if the.
suit has been improperly brought, the demurrer must be sustained, and it will not
be necessary for us to inquirg further into
the matter. Let us, then, proceed to an
examination of this aspect of the case.
This company was incorporated under
the so-called manufacturing Acts, by
which term are denominated the Act of
April 7, 1849, and the Act of April 29, 1874,
and their supplements. The fifteenth section of the latter Act, in so far as it points
out the manner in which stockholders of
an insolvent corporation may be held
liable for the debt,; of the corporation, isa
substantial re-enactment of the first mentioned, the Act of April 7, 1849.
These Acts, similar in their provisions,
thus establish a spdcific remedy in behalf
of the creditors against the stockholders
of an insolvent corporation, and to the
JOHN JACKSON vs. PETER PAYNE. provisions of these Acts, which operate in
abrogation of the rule of the common law,
Corporation-Creditorseeking to recover there must be a rigid adherence by him
from stockholdersmust join the corpora- who invokes their assistance. If any authority be needed in support of a proposition as defendant.
tion so elementary, it may be found in
O'Reilly v. Bard, 105 Pa. 569, and in
LAVENS and WINLACK for plaintiff.
Hoard
v. Wilcox, 47 Pa. 51, where it is
SHAFFER and BOLTE for defendant.
held, in the words of the syllabus, that
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
"the remedy for the collection of debts
Payne subscribed for ten shares of stock, due by manufacturing corporations organ$100 per share, in the Cumberland Manu- ized under the Act of April 7, 1849, and its
facturing Company. The company oper- supplement, is special, and the requireated for four years, and contracted debts ments of the statute must be strictly folto various persons, inter quos was Jack- lowed."
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Has the defendant failed to comply with described in section 15, of the Act of April
these requirements in not joining he cor- 29, 1874, 1 P. & L. 966, is applicable only to
poration as defendant? Under the au- this liability, and not to that of a stockthorities there can be no doubt upon this holder to pay his unpaid stock subscrippoint. In the case of Hoard v. Wilson, 47 tion, Lane's Appeal, supra. It does not
Pa. 51, (above cited) the Supreme Court re- appear that Jackson's debt came from
versed the judgment of the court below "work or labor done." It may have been
in favor of the plaintiff below, who failed for materials furnished. If it was he
to join the corporation as defendant, on the would be precluded from resorting to the
sole ground of this omission to comply remedy defined in the fifteenth section.
with this provision of the Act. "A cred- It would doubtless have been true, as the
itor, who seeks to recover from stockholders learned court below has said, that if the
obligation, whose enforcement is sought
on the insolvency of such corporations,
cannot maintain his action against part of by Jackson's bill, had been that created
them sued alone, without joining the cor- by the fourteenth section of the Act of
1874, and the third section of the Act of
poration with them in his action, even tho'
he have previously obtained a judgment 1876, no other remedy than that furnished
against the corporation,'' which so far as in the fifteenth section of the former Act
the pleadings show, was not done by the would be available. But, as a different
plaintiff in the case at bar. (See also obligation is sought to be asserted, it as
Brinham v. Wellenbury Coal Co., 47 Pa. plainly results, that some other remedy
than that proffered by the fifteenth sec43, and Mansfield v. Wilcox, 52 Pa. 377).
It is well established by authority that tion must be looked to.
The present bill is filed by a creditor of
a bill in equity is the proper remedy in
cases similar to this, and that suit mqy be the corporation to receive payment of his
brought, after the issue of futile process debt out of the unpaid subscription of a
against the corporation, by any one of the shareholder. It will be necessary to note
creditors, against any or all of the stock- the conditions on which such a bill could
holders, provided the corporation be joined be maintained.
Ordinarily, a judgment against the corin the suit. Because of the plaintiff's
failure to comply with this latter require- poration, followed by an execution and a
return of nulla bona, is a precondition to
ment, he must fail in his action.
Without going into any further discus- the filing of a bill by the creditor against
sion of this case, therefore, we sustain the the stockholders. 3 Thomp. Corp. 357; 1
demurrer and dismiss the bill at the cost of Cook, Stock, 249. Says Trunkey, J., "A
creditor who has exhausted his remedy at
the plaintiff.
law, is clearly entitled to the assistance of
EUGENE D. SIEGRIST, P. J.
equity to aid him in obtaining. satisfaction
The Cumberland Manufacturing Com- of his claim out of the assets in the hands
pany was incorporated under the Act of of stockholders who possess them." CorApril 29, 1874. The fourteenth section of nell's Appeal, 114 Pa. 153. In the cases we
that Act had imposed on stockholders a have inspected, Cornell's Appeal; Lane's
liability to the amount of stock held by Appeal, 105 Pa. 49 ; Hamilton v. Railroad
them "for all work or labor done, or ma- Co., 144 Pa. 34; Bell's Appeal, 115 Pa. 88;
terials furnished to carry on the opera- Bailey v. Coal Railroad Co., 139 Pa. 213 ;
tions" of the corporation. The third sec- the bill averred the recovery of judgment,
tion of the Act of April 17, 1876, 1 P. & L. issue of ft. fa. and return of nulla bona.
965, amends this section by eliminating Jackson's bill, for omitting to aver this, is
from it the words, "or materialsfurnished."
demurrable.
The liability thus 'createdi is not that to
Another condition to the maintenance
pay the stock subscriptions. The latter of such a bill, is that it should unite the
would exist independently of the statute. corporation, as defendant, with the stockThe liability created by the Act of 1874 holders. 1 Cook, Stock, 2.58. In the cases
and 1876 is one to pay a sum equal to the cited supra, the corporation was a costock subscribed, and additional thereto. defendant. For non-joinder of it, JackLane's Appeal, 105 Pa. 49,57. Themethod son's bill is demurrable.
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Whether the bill if filed by less than all
the creditors should be filed for the plaintiffs named, and for such others as may
choose to make themselves parties, is perhaps not settled in Pennsylvania. That it
should be seems to be implied by Lane's
Appeal, 105 Pa. 49, 67; Bell's Appeal, 115
Pa. 88, on the theory that the capital stock
is a trust fund for the ratable payment of
all the creditors. Cf. Hamilton v. Railroad, 144 Pa. 34; Johnston v. Markle Co.,
153 Pa. 189. But, in Bailey v. Coal Railroad Co., 139 Pa. 213, a -bill filed by one
creditor, which did not negative the existence of other creditors, and was not
filed in behalf of the plaintiff and other
creditors, was sustained on demurrer.
Cornell's Appeal, 114 Pa. 153, is a distinct
authority for the doctrine that joinder of
all creditors isunnecessary. The omission
of the averment, in Jackson's bill, that he
is the sole creditor, does not make it demurrable.
The bill names only one stockholder defendant. It is suggested that all stockholders ought to have been joined with
him. This, however, is unnecessary.
Bailey v. Coal Railroad Co., 139 Pa. 213.
In Hamilton v. Railroad Co., 144 Pa. 34,
three stockholders, owning but 550 shares
out of 20,000, were the sole defendants. In
Cornell's appeal, 114 Pa. 153; where only
some of the stockholders were defendants,
Trunkey, J., remarks, "Nor was it necessary to make all stockholders, who had
not paid, defendants. The burden does
not rest on the plaintiffs to adjust the
equities between persons who individually
hold portions of the trust fund, especially
where each denies that he holds any part
of the fund." Stang's Appeal, 10 W. N.
C. 409; Hatch v. Dana, 101 U. $. 205.
The learned court below was correct in
sustaining the demurrer on the ground
that the corporation was not made a codefendant; not because the act of 1874 requires the joinder of the corporation, but
because thisjoinder is exacted by the usage
of the equity courts.
The appeal is dismissed.

COMMONWEALTH vs. JACOB WOLF.
Locality of crime - Jurisdiction-False
Pretense-Deliveryto carrieris delivery
to consignee.

HENDERSON and SHIPMAN for plaintiff.
PIPER and C01LENTZ for defendant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Wolf, a merchant in Carlisle, went to
Philadelphia and bought there certain
goods-shirts, hats, hose, neckties. Ie
represented to the Philadelphia merchant
that he had re d estate worth $5.000, with
no liens on it; that his stock of goods was
worth $3,500, and that his debts were less
than$2,700. A small box containing neckties worth $10, was delivered to him in
Philadelphia, and he brought them with
him to Carlisle. The rest of the goods, for
which he paid $215, were shipped by the
Pennsylvania Railroad, and were received
by him in Carlisle five days later. Wolf,
at the time of the purchase, had a house
in Carlisle worth $3,000. There was a
judgment against him for $1,400, a lien
thereon. His stock of goods was worth
only $1,000. All his other property was
worth but $250. He was indicted in the
Q. S. of Cumberland'county, for obtaining
goods of the Philadelphia merchant by
reason of false pretense, one count for
the neckties, and another for the rest of
the goods.
Motion to quash the indictment.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The obtaining of chattels, money, etc.,
by false pretenses, with intent to cheatand
defraud, is made a crime by the Act 31
March, 1860, P. and L. dig. 1200.
It is a well recognized principle of the
law, that unless a court has jurisdiction of
a crime or misdemeanor, it cannot take
cognizance of and punish it. Jurisdiction
is given to the Quarter Sessions in the
various counties, over crime committed in
their respective county, by the Act of 31
March, 1860, Brig. Purd. Dig. 1769, which
provides that, "the courts of quarter sessions of the peace, shall have jurisdiction
and power within the respective counties,
to inquire by the oath or affirmations of
good and lawful men of the county, of all
crimes and misdemeanors and offenses
whatsoever, against the laws of this commonwealth, which shall be triable in the
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respective county." This jurisdiction is
Wolf, the defendant, went to Philadelfurther recognized and granted, in the phia, and there made false representations
case of the Commonwealth vs. Kunzman to a Philadelphia merchant as to his finan41 Pa. 429, where it is held, that, "by the cial condition. Upon the strength of these
common law, crimes and misdemeanors, representations certain transfers or sales of
are cognizable and punishable exclusively goods were made to him, one of which
within the jurisdiction where they are was the delivery to him, personally, in
Philadelphia, of a box of ties. There is
committed."
The question to be determined here is, here the full and actual transfer of the subwhether the crime of which Wolf is ac- ject of the first count in this indictment.
The goods were delivered by the merchant,
cused, was committed in Philadelphia
and received by Wolf personally, in Philacounty or in Cumberland county. If in
the former, then this court has not juris- delphia; the transaction being completely
closed then. The false representations
diction of this case, and the indictment
in this case must be quashed, but if in the were successfully used, and the property
latter., then this court can properly take actually received in the county of Philadelphia, hence the crime was committed
cognizance of, and try the case.
False representations amounting to false there and is subject only to the jurisdiction
pretenses, within the meaning of the stat- of the Philadelphia courts.
ute, do not constitute crime, unless the
As to the second count, the goods were
property has been actually obtained, hence shipped to Wolf by the Pennsylvania
it is generally held, that the crime is com- Railroad and were actually received by
plete where chattels or goods are procured. him, in Carlisle, five days later, but he
The offense of cheating by false pretense is considered, in the contemplation of
is, in the judgment of the law, committed the law, as having received them in
where the false pretenses are successfully
Philadelphia at the time when the goods
used, and when the money or property is were placed by the consignor in the hands
obtained; the crime is complete at the of the common carrier. Says the court
place where the goods or chattels are ac- in Commonwealth v. Goldstinte, 3 C. C.
quired. The People v. Adams, 3 Denio. 121, supra, the well established doctrine,
190; Commonwealth v. Goldstein, 3 C. C. that the delivery to the common carrier,
121. In the latter case it is also held that is a delivery to the consignee, must
in determining where the crime is com- apply in criminal cases in determining
pleted, and to fix the jurisdiction the well when the crime was completed, and to
established doctrine, that delivery to the fix the jurisdiction. So that when the
common carrier is a delivery to the con- vendor placed the goods upon the train at
signee, must apply.
Philadelphia they passed entirely out of
In Commonwealth v. Andrew Karpow- his control (subject only to the right of
ski, 167 Pa. 225, it is held that "when a stoppage in transit) into the possession of
purchaser of goods, living in a different
Wolf, the vendee, so that the crime which
county from the vendor, makes false rep- is the subject matter of the second count
resentation to the vendor's agent, upon the of the indictment, was completed and comstrength of which goods are sold, and the mitted in Philadelphia county. The
vendor delivers the goods in the county transactions complained of in the two
where he resides to a common carrier, ad- counts, were the results of false representadressed to the purchaser, a conviction for tions made in Philadelphia. The offer to
false pretenses may be had in the county buy was made there upon these representations; the acceptance was made there,
where the vendor resides.
From this it will be seen that the prin- and the sales were completed and the
ciple is well established, that when one by goods transferred by the merchant to Wolf
false representations, acquires the goods, in Philadelphia county. Hence this
money or chattels of another, the court in crime, being committed entirely in the
the place where the false pretenses are county of Philadelphia, this court has not
made, and the goods procured, is the court jurisdiction of it. The indictment is,.
which has jurisdiction of the crime, and therefore, quashed, and the prisoner disnot any other.
charged.
JORDAN, J.
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THE SUPERIOR COURT.

The crime of false pretenses consists in
the obtaining of a chattel, etc., by false
pretense. It is quite clear that if neither
the pretending nor the obtaining took
place in Cumberland county, the court
sitting therein has no jurisdiction of the
offence. The pretenses were made in
Philadelphia. Where occurred the obtaining? The box of neckties was delivered
td Wolf in Philadelphia, and he brought
it with him to Carlisle. He obtained this
box in Philadelphia. The courts sitting
there, alone, had jurisdiction of this offence.
The rest of the goods were shipped in
Philadelphia, on the Pennsylvania Railroad, consigned to Wolf. They were,
therefore, delivered to him there. Com. v.
Hess, 148 Pa. 98; Perlman v. Sartorius,
162 Pa. 320 ; Com. v. Fleming, 130 Pa. 138 ;
Garbracht v. Com. 96 Pa. 449; Com. v.
Karpowski, 167 Pa. 225 ; Braunn v. Keally,
146 Pa. 519. And where they were delivered they were obtained. The crime of
obtaining these goods by false pretenses
was, therefore, committed in Philadelphia, Com. v. Karpowski, 167 Pa. 22.5, and
not elsewhere. The court of Cumberland
has, therefore, no jurisdiction. Of. Norris
v. State, 25 Oh. St. 217 ; 2 Wh. Crim. Law,
96; Queen v. Ellis, 12 B. 231 (1899) cited
in Am. L. Reg. April, 1899. The court of
quarter sessions properly quashed the indictment. Judgment affirmed.
ADAM HOCK vs. BOROUGH
MECHANICSBURG.

OF

Borough's liability for dangerous streets
-Contributory negligence- Proximate
cause.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

An electric railway pole standing in the
street of the borough of Mechanicsburg,
was rotted away at the ground, and for
three months had been threatening to fall.
Neither the company or the borough, however, removed it. On March 17, 1899, a
high wind blew the pole over into the
street, and in falling, it struck a car then
passing, seriously injuring the' motorman,
Hock. The car was going at the rate of
twelve miles per hour, twice as fast as the
ordinance of the borough allowed, and had

it been going at but six miles per hour, it
would not have been struck. Hock sues
for $2500 damages.

AUBREY and

ALEXANDER for plaintiff.

1. The fact that the plaintiffwas violating the borough ordinance, at the time of
the alleged injury, does not preclude him
from a recovery of damages, if such violation was not the proximate cause of the
injury. A. & E. Enc. 1st Ed. Vol. 4, p. 50;
Mahoney v. Cook, 26 Pa. 342; Freeman v.
Walton, 2 Forum 37; Hess v. Railway Co.,
2 Forum 65; Lederman v. Railway Co., 165
Pa. 118.
2. The duty imposed upon a municipal
corporation is that of keeping the highway
free from such defects as render it unsafe
for travel. Norristown v. Moyer, 67 Pa.
355; Erie v. Schwingle, 22 Pa. 384; Heidenway v. Phila., 15 C. C. 200; McKeesport v.
Ry. Co., 3 Sup. 242; Smith v. Mauch
Chunk, 4 Sup. 495.
BASEHORE and PRINCE for defendant.
1. Violation of a municipal ordinance
by plaintiffis such evidence of contributory
negligence as will defeat his right to recover damages. Trickett on Pennsylvania
Borough .Law, Vol. 2, p. 154. Vol. 1, p.
459; Monongahela City v. Fischer, ll Pa.
9; Conner v. Traction Co., 173 Pa. 602;
Lederman v. Ry. Co., 165 Pa. 118; Pennsylvania Co. v. James, 811 Pa. 194; Muscarro v. Ry. Co., 192 Pa. 8.
2. A borough is not liable for latent defects without notice. Trickett on Pennsylvania Borough Law, Vol. 2, p. 151; Childs
v. Crawford Co., 176 Pa. 139; Duncan v.
Philadelphia, 173 Pa. 550.
CHARGE OF COURT.

Gentlemen of the Jury:
A few principles will control this case.
It is the duty of the borough to superintend its streets and see that they are safe
for those who are upon them. Not only
must it not, itself cause perils, by excavation, erection of structures apt to fall, etc.,
but it must exercise due care to prevent the
causing of such perils by others, and,
when caused, to remove them promptly.
The pole, whose fall caused the hurt to
Hock, was not planted by the borough. It
does not follow that it owed no duty to inhabitants, with respect to the pole. When
it became too weak to stand, it was the
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borough's duty to cause it to be removed.
Norristown v. Moyer, 67 Pa. 356.
It is true that the electric railway company, having under the law occupied the
streets, could not be compelled to remove
its tracks and poles. These it maintains
with the some authority, as that under
which the borough exerts municipal power,
viz: the state speaking by its legislature.
The right of the company however is conditioned. It may not use any sort ofpoles,
or plant them at any points, arbitrarily.
It is bound to maintain sound and strong
poles. Livingston v. Wolf, 186 Pa. 519.
If, after warning from the borough, it had
refused to remove the rotten pole, the
borough could lawfully have removed it.
The power to remove the pole is the obverse
side of the duty to remove it. The right
of a borough to charge a license fee for it,
is founded in part, on the responsibility
which the municipality assumes. Says
the Supreme Court in Chester City v. W.
U. Tel. Co., 154 Pa. 464, "It is the duty of
the city to see that the poles are safe and
properly maintained, and should a citizen
be injured in person or property by reason
of a neglect of such duty, an action might
lie against the city for the consequences of
such neglect." 2 Borough Law, 59.
It was the duty of the borough to inspect the poles from time to time, when
their age gave reason to suspect them of
decay, and if Mechanicsburg neglected to
make the inspection, and for this reason
was ignorant of the condition of the pole,
or if, being aware of its condition, it undily
delayed to require the railway company to
replace it, it has been guilty of negligence
which has caused the accident to Hock.
Hardly denying, however, the negligence of the defendant, the main defence
of the borough is the alleged contributory
negligence of Hock, the plaintiff. He was
driving the car at the rate of twelve miles
per hour, and it is conceded by the plaintiff
that, had thecarbeen goingatbutsix miles
per hour, it would not have been where it
was when the pole fell upon it. What the
effect of aviolation of the ordinanceas such
is, it is not now useful to discuss. Freeman v. Walton, 2Forum37. Wemay concede for the present that such violation
imports negligence.
But, negligence
is irrelevant, unless it in some way produced the injury ; and its tendency to pro-

duce the injury could be seen. What
really caused the injury was the presence
of the car at the pole, WHFN the pole fell.
But, whether the pole was going to fall, or,
if so, at what exact moment, was not forseen. Nor, was it forseen whether swift
or slow motion would bring it to the spot
at the moment of the fall. For the car to
pass at all on the street, might conceivably
have been negligent, but it is not easy to
discover why fast passing was any more
negligent than slow, so far as the production of the injury is concerned. In a
similar case Fell, J., says: "That his
speed brought him to the place of the accident at the moment of the accident; was
the merest chance, and a thing which no
foresight could have predicted. The same
thing might as readily have happened to a
car running slowly, or it might have been
that a high speed alone would have carried
him beyond the tree to a place of safety."
We are unable to see how the speed of
the car can be said to have been negligent
invitation of or contribution to the accident that actually occurred.
But one matter, therefore, is to be considered. You will decide whether the
borough itself was negligent with respect
to the pole, and whether due care in this
regard would have averted the accident.
If this question is answered affirmatively
it will be your duty to render a verdict for
the plaintiff for the damages suffered by
him.

ESTATE OF AMANDA GREIB, DECEASED.
Desertion-Curtesy.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

In 1880 John Greib, the husband of
Amanda Greib, deceased, left his home and
wife in Miles Township, Centre County,
Pa., and went west. He did not since
then send her any support, or make any
provisions at any time for her support or
maintenance. About one year ago he returned to this county, but did not go to
live with his wife, nor did he give her support, or offer to do so.
On August 1, 1899; Amanda Greib died,
testate. In her last will and testament she

TTHE VORUM.
provided for the sale of her real and personal estate, and the proceeds to be divided
between two of her sisters.
The executor made public sale of her
real estate, but at the said sale the husband
above named appeared and notified all
purchasers and bidders that he had a life
estate in this property so sold. The executor gave notice that he could not retain
a life interest, and the property was sold.
John Greib, claiming a curtesy, asks
that the money be paid to him, or invested,
and its interest paid to him.
STE WART and FRA-NTZ for plaintiff.
1. A jury must pronounce these facts a
desertion before the, case can come under
the statute. McGrew v. Hart, 35 Pitts. L.
J. 166; Littles's Estate, 7 Phila. 495;
Charleton's Estate, 3W. N. C. 305; Bealor
v. Rahn, 117 Pa. 169 ; Hahn v. Bealor, 182
Pa. 242.
JOHN and KENNEDY for defendant.
1. The plaintiff having deserted and
neglected to support the deceased for a
year immediately prior to her death, his
curtesy is barred. Bealorv. Hahn, 117 Pa.
169 ; Hahn v. fBealor, 132 Pa. 242; Moninger v. Ritner, 104 Pa. 299 ; Schwan v.
Kelly, 173 Pa. 65: Lease v. Ensminger, 5
Sup. Ct. 329 ; Act of May 4, 1855, 2 P. &
L. 2,902.
OPINION OF COURT.
John Grieb, if entitled to the curtesy, is
not deprived of it by the Orphans' Court
sale. He gave notice thereat, of his claim,
and the purchaser has taken the risk of
his being able to sustain it. He chooses,
however, to claim for life the fund produced by the sale. Is he entitled to it?
We think not.
1. The sale was made, under the will,
which directs the division of the proceeds
between the two sisters of the testatrix.
The husband may either assent to the will,
or he may claim his curtesy despite it. If

he does the latter, the land is still his. If
he does the former, neither the land nor
its value is his. He cannot affirm the
will, in so far that it orders a sale, and disaffirm it in so far as it orders the proceeds
to be paid to the sisters.
2. The fifth section of the act of May
4th, 1855, 2 P. & L. 2,902, enacts that "no
husband who shall have, as aforesaid, for
one year or upwards previous to the death
of his wife, wilfully neglected or refused
to provide for his wife, or shall have for
that period or upwards, wilfully or maliciously deserted her, shall have the right
to claim any right or title in her real or
personal estate, after her decease, as tenant
by the curtesy, or under the intestate laws
of this Commonwealth." There are here
mentioned two causes of forfeiture of the
curtesy; neglect to provide for the wife,
and wilful and malicious desertion. Is
John Grieb guilty of either of these acts?
He left his wife, going west, in 1880. In
1898 he returned to Centre County, not going to her, nor, so far as appears, inviting
her to go to him. When nothing appears,
save a separation from the wife by the act
of the husband, we think the only legitimate inference is that it was in the legal
sense wilful and malicious. If facts existed,justifyingthe separationGrieb ought
to show them. He has not done so. He
allows proof to be made that he left his
wife and remained away for nineteen
years, without tendering a suggestion,
even, of excuse. What other conclusion
could be drawn, than that he had none?
1 Bishop, Marriage and Divorce, 715;
Hahn v. Bealor, 132 Pa. 242. "It is incumbent on him to show that he had
reasonable and lawful cause."
The petition of John Grieb is, therefore,
dismissed.

